Recent evidence from an exhaustive political-economy study of growth of African economies -the Growth Project of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) -suggests that 'policy syndromes' have substantially contributed to the generally poor growth in sub-Saharan Africa during post-independence. The current article employs the unique data and insights generated by the Growth Project to further explore the importance of a 'syndrome-free' (SF) regime for growth in the region by examining: (i) the channels via which SF affects growth: total factor productivity (TFP) versus factors of production; and (ii) the role of institutions in mediating this impact, with special attention accorded the efficacy of the restraint on the executive branch of government in mitigating the potentially adverse effect of ethnicity.
Growth of African Economies: Productivity, Policy Syndromes and the Importance of Institutions

Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that 'policy syndromes' have substantially contributed to the generally poor growth of African economies during post-independence. 1 Had sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 2 been bereft of these syndromes, its per capita GDP growth could have averaged approximately 2 percentage points higher during the post-independence period (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006, table 6) . The current paper employs the unique data and insights generated by the Growth Project to further explore the importance of a syndrome-free (SF) regime for growth in this region by examining: (i) the channels via which SF affects growth: total factor productivity (TFP) versus factors of production; and (ii) the role of institutions in mediating this impact. In particular, in the light of previous findings that ethnic division could lead to anti-growth policies (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997) in Africa, coupled with findings that the executive branch of government was often a culprit in the perpetration of such policies (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006) , the present paper examines how the degree of restraint on the executive could mitigate such potentially adverse effect of ethnicity.
In the immediately following section, aggregate evidence on the saliency of TFP vis-à-vis contributions by factors of production in the African growth record is presented.
Section 3 briefly discusses the various syndromes and their expected effects on the sources of growth. Section 4 explores the relative potency of the channels by, first, estimating how SF is correlated with TFP versus factors of production using 1960-1 The AERC 'Growth Project' is a comprehensive study combining both cross-sectional analysis and a large number of detailed country cases to explain the African growth record since 1960, which is viewed herein as the post-independent era generally. It has resulted in two Cambridge University Press volumes: Ndulu et al. (2008a Ndulu et al. ( , 2008b ). An epitomized version of the study is presented in Fosu and O'Connell (2006) . 'Policy syndromes' comprise the following regimes: 'state controls', 'adverse redistribution', 'sub-optimal inter-temporal resource allocation', and 'state breakdown'. These are further delineated below. Note that the "classification is based on policies, not growth outcomes" (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006; p. 37) . For further details, see ibid. 2 'Africa' and 'SSA' will be used interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
2000/2004 panel data. Second, based on these data, the SF impact on per capita GDP growth, via TFP, is estimated using an augmented production function. 3 The paper then explores the extent to which the adverse effect of SF can be mitigated via stronger institutions by treating SF endogenously. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Decomposition of Growth in Africa
Based on the Collins-Bosworth decomposition, table 1 reports data on the sources of GDP growth for SSA over 1960-2000. 4 These statistics indicate that when GDP in SSA as a whole grew relatively well in the 1960s through the mid-1970s, that growth was supported about equally by both investment and TFP growth. In contrast, the major decline in growth in the early 1980s, and again in the early 1990s, was accompanied by a large fall in TFP each time. The main source of the growth recovery in the late 1990s was once again TFP improvement. **** Table 1 about here****
The above observations suggest that TFP must have played a major role in the growth performance of African economies. Devarajan et al (2003) , for instance, argue that it is the low productivity rather than the level of investment that has been the constraint to African growth. Indeed, as table 1 reveals, the overall modest per-worker growth in SSA during the forty-year period was supported by positive, albeit modicum, contributions from physical capital and education, while TFP contribution was negative, though near-zero. 3 See also Fosu (2011) , which provides evidence on how SF affects growth through TFP and presents in greater detail much of the qualitative evidence reported herein. As a point of departure, the present study treats SF endogenously and additionally explores how institutions might be employed to accentuate the prevalence of the growth-enhancing SF. There is an endogenous treatment of the syndromes in Ndulu et al (2008a) also; however, there is little attention on the role of institutions per se in influencing growth via SF.
Nor is there an attempt in Ndulu et al to examine the effect of SF via productivity vis-à-vis factors of production. 4 As the SF data are for 1960-2000, the source-of-growth analysis is similarly limited. The decomposition is based on the production function: (table 1) (4.25); -0.081 (0.99); and 0.930 (31.06). Thus, growth is correlated most strongly with TFP, followed by physical capital, while there is little correlation with education. These results are in line with the above aggregate-level evidence and provide support for Devarajan et al (2003) .
The Policy Syndromes and Syndrome-Free Impacts on Sources of Growth
Growth accounting decompositions discussed above have revealed the relative roles of human capital (education), physical capital accumulation and TFP in the growth of African economies during the post-independence period. Numerous reasons have been presented in the literature as the culprits for the growth record. In particular, initial conditions have received attention, including: colonial origins (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001) , geography (e.g., Bloom and Sachs, 1998) , and the slave trade (e.g., Nunn, 2008) .
While such studies are analytically attractive, they generally offer little in terms of policy prescription, since initial conditions are seldom reversible. 5
The main thesis of the Growth Project is that policies matter for growth in Africa, despite the initial conditions. 6 The project defines the following 'policy syndromes' as detrimental to growth: 'state controls', 'adverse redistribution', 'suboptimal intertemporal resource allocation', and 'state breakdown', with the absence of all of the above syndromes referred to as 'syndrome-free' (SF). 7 Discussed briefly below are these policy syndromes, including their half-decadal evolution during 1960-2000 (table 2) . 5 Among the few exceptions is the disease implication of geography, such as malaria, which could be mitigated by for instance undertaking appropriate preventive policy action in malaria-prone geographical regions. 6 See footnote1 for further details. 7 Much of the present section derives from Fosu (2008a) , which presents a number of case studies to illustrate each syndrome and the SF regime. The definitions of the regimes, provided below, form the basis for the classification of each country-year into one or more of the categories by the editorial committee of the Growth Project (for details see Collier and O'Connell, 2007; Fosu, 2008a; Fosu and O'Connell, 2006) . Note that "classification is based on policies, not growth outcomes" (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006; p. 37) . For example, though Sudan grew rather rapidly in the late 1990s it was not categorized during this period as 'syndrome-free' but instead as 'state breakdown'. Conversely, Malawi was designated 'syndrome-free' *** Table 2 about here***
State Controls
A country in a given year was classified as having 'state controls' if the government was judged to have "heavily distorted major economic markets (labor, finance, domestic and international trade, and production) in service of state-led and inward-looking development strategies" (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006, p.38) . During the immediate postindependent period in the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, a major reigning development paradigm was Fabian socialism, which involved strong reliance on government as the main agent of development. The choice of this mode of development was usually justified on the basis of limited markets and private capital. Another rationale, however, was apparently that the leaders of the newly created African nations were determined to free their respective economies from the existing colonial arrangement, which often had these countries supplying primary products in exchange for manufactures from their 'colonial masters'. 8 Many African governments, therefore, opted for the inward-looking, import-substitution, state-led development strategy.
The above strategy often entailed the use of controls to allocate scarce resources, resulting in the usual economic inefficiencies including rent-seeking activities. Thus, we should expect such controls to negatively impact TFP and hence growth. 9 While the relative frequency of this syndrome during 1960-2000 averaged about a third, it has been less than uniform over the period (table 2) . The relative frequency of state controls exceeded 30 percent in the early 1960s, reached a half-decadal peak in excess of 40 percent during the early 1980s, but ebbed considerably thereafter, representing only about throughout the post-independence period, yet it stagnated in the 1980s, and so did Cote d'Ivoire in the early 1980s despite its syndrome-free classification during that period. 8 African leaders were also influenced by the school of thought at the time, informed by particularly the Prebisch and Singer hypothesis, that industrialization through manufactures was a more potent modality for development. 9 While controls were pervasive in nearly all markets, the fixed exchange rate regime of the external sector was especially noteworthy. This policy often resulted in overvaluation of the domestic currency in most African countries, constituting a major deterrent to growth (e.g., Ghura and Grennes, 1993) . The control policy also tended to introduce an urban bias that tended to subsidize urban dwellers at the expense of production incentives for rural producers of cash crops (Bates, 1981) .
15 percent by the late 1990s (table 2) , likely in response to the World Bank-orchestrated structural adjustment reforms undertaken in many African countries (Fosu, 2008a) .
Adverse Redistribution
'Adverse redistribution' refers to a situation where redistributive policies favour the constituencies of the respective government leaders, usually regional in nature and with ethnic undertones, resulting in polarization (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006 (Kimenyi, 2006) .
Indeed, the polarization engendered by this syndrome could lead to open conflict and state breakdown. 12
As apparent from the above discussion, by breeding economic inefficiency the redistributive syndrome is likely to adversely affect growth through primarily TFP. The syndrome's relative frequency increased steadily right from the time of independence, and it was not until about the early 1990s that it began to reverse course (Fosu, 2008a , (table 2) . 10 It is important to stress, though, that redistribution need not be adverse, that is, if it promotes harmony. As Azam (1995) for instance argues, governments could use redistribution to buy peace, especially between the north and the south in many West African countries (e.g., Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria). 11 African political history is replete with examples of redistributive policies partial toward certain ethnic groups, such as: favouring the Tutsis in Burundi during 1975-87 (Nkurunziza and Ngarako, 2004) , the Kalenjins in Kenya under President Arap Moi (Mwega and Ndugu, 2004) , the Temnes in Sierra Leone by the All People's Congress during 1969-90 (Davies, 2004) , and the Kabeyes in Togo by President Eyadema in 1976-90 (Gogue and Evlo, 2004) . 12 See, for instance, the cases of Burundi (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2004) and Sierra Leone (Davies, 2004) .
Suboptimal Inter-temporal Resource Allocation
'Suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocation' is a syndrome of revenue misallocation over time. It entails overspending in commodity booms and under-spending during the subsequent busts Fosu, 2008a; Fosu and O'Connell, 2006) .
Although a number of the projects undertaken in African countries during booms might have been economically justifiable, there were also numerous projects that were either illadvised or were over-allocated resources relative to their absorptive capacities. Many of these projects were simply abandoned due to resulting fiscal difficulties when the booms ended; hence their values of marginal product fell short of the potential. Bust periods would often be characterized by much larger output declines than would have been the case with more prudent inter-temporal revenue management. The misallocation would often, therefore, result in inefficient overinvestment and as a decline in TFP. 13
The relative incidence of this syndrome was rather small, though, representing only about 10 percent of the country-years during 1960-2000. It was quite minimal in the immediate post-independence period, but then began increasing in the early 1970s, achieving a relatively high plateau as of the mid-1970s amidst commodity booms in many African countries, and then fell starting from the latter part of the 1980s (Fosu, 2008a , Figures 3.1 and 3.2; table 2 this paper).
State Breakdown/Failure
'State breakdown/failure' refers mainly to open warfare, such as civil wars, but also to acute elite political instability involving coups d'état that result in a breakdown of law and order (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006) . 14 In addition to causing tolls in human suffering, state breakdown tends to generate major interruptions in production and distribution, as well as in inefficient reallocation of resources from the productive and social sectors into 13 Examples of this scenario abound, including cases of: Nigeria in the late1970s to early 1980s, Cameroon in the 1980s and early 1990s, and Zambia in the 1970s and eighties (see the Appendix A table) . 14 Most of the classifications into state breakdowns involved civil wars, which have indeed been found to be growth-inhibiting (e.g., Collier, 1999; Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, 2005) . However, many studies have also uncovered adverse effects of the incidence of coups d'etat on growth in Africa (e.g., Fosu 2003 Fosu , 2002 Fosu , 1992 Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor 1999) .
the non-productive military sector. Hence, although it can reduce investment as well, this syndrome is likely to particularly exert deleterious impacts on TFP.
State breakdown constituted about 10 percent of the country-years during 1960-2000, a rate that is considerably lower than that of state controls (33 percent) or adverse redistribution (21 percent), though about the same as that for suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocation (table 2) . Despite general belief, moreover, state breakdown in terms of civil wars has historically been rather rare in Africa generally, that is, until more recently in the 1990s when its relative frequency increased to 20 percent of the countryyears, from about 5 percent in the 1970s (table 2). In spite of this syndrome's historically low frequency, however, its impact can be quite large. 15
The Syndrome-free Regime
A country-year is considered 'syndrome-free' (SF) if none of the above syndromes is present. That would be a regime with a combination of political stability and reasonably market-friendly policies (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006) . Interestingly, at more than onequarter of the country-years, the frequency of SF was rather large in 1960-2000, and higher than that of any of the policy syndromes except the regulatory (table 2) . Indeed, in the immediate post-independence period of 1960-65, the relative frequency of SF was at about 50 percent. The prevalence of SF, however, began to wane starting in the latter 1960s, especially in the 1970s when state controls and other syndromes became dominant. The downward trend continued until roughly the mid-1980s when it reversed course. The upward trend actually accelerated in the 1990s, most likely as a result of the World Bank and IMF-championed market-oriented reforms (Fosu, 2008a) .
Most African countries have undergone substantial economic and political reforms since the early 1990s. The relative frequency of state controls has, for instance, fallen from its peak of over 50 percent in the early 1980s to just 15 percent by the dawn of the millennium (Fosu and O'Connell, 2008) . The incidence of adverse redistribution has also declined to approximately 20 percent by 2000 from its maximum of about 30 percent in the late 1980s. As observed above, the only syndrome that has shown an 15 The impact of state breakdown on Africa's per capita annual GDP growth is estimated to be as much as 2.6 percentage points (Fosu and O'Connell, 2006, third of its gap with East Asia and Pacific, and more than the gap with South Asia (ibid.).
Modelling the Effects of SF and Institutions/Governance through TFP
Further explored in the present study is the role of the SF regime in explaining the economic growth of African economies. Given the above discussion that the effect of SF is likely to be primarily via TFP, Figure 2 presents superimposed graphs of SF and TFP growth using five-year averages over 1960-2000. It is interesting that these two graphs move rather closely together. Coupled with the above observation that GDP growth was most closely related with TFP, rather than with the production inputs as shown in Figure   1 , for instance, Figure 2 suggests a high inter-temporal co-movement between SF and growth.
*** Figure 2 about there***
We now employ an augmented production-function approach in order to quantitatively investigate the channels by which SF may have influenced growth: via production factor inputs versus TFP. This approach differs from those of Collier and O'Connell (2008) and Fosu and O'Connell (2006) , both of which use essentially reducedform models that controlled for shocks and geographical endowment, 16 and could not isolate the productivity effect. Moreover, I employ herein a five-year, rather than annual, panel in an attempt to capture the long-term impact of SF. Also examined is the importance of governance in the growth equation.
As preliminary evidence on the role of SF in growth, pair-wise zero-order correlation coefficients between SF, on the one hand, and per capita GDP growth and its sources, on other hand, are computed using the country data from the Appendix A To further examine the channel by which SF affects growth, I postulate as the starting point a simple Cobb-Douglas production function:
where Q is output, L labor, and K capital; A, b, and c are the respective parameters. The growth version of equation (1) is:
where q, l and k are the growth rates of output, labor and capital, respectively, and a, b
and c are the respective estimable parameters.
Equation (2) is the classical production function, an augmented version of which has been estimated in many studies. 17 However, in order to more appropriately compare the current results with those of Fosu and O'Connell (2006) , for instance, equation (2) is converted to per-capita growth as:
where y is per-capita output growth; population is assumed to grow at the rate of nl, with n, the ratio of population to labor growth, greater (less) than unity if population grows faster (slower) than labor.
As the Hicks-neutral technological change measuring growth in total factor productivity (TFP), the parameter a may be especially susceptible to the policy-syndrome nature of the economy, as argued above. It has, furthermore, been observed within the sources-of-growth framework above that TFP appears to be a crucial source for the generally low growth of African economies since the 1960s. (3) and (4), the model to be estimated may be specified as:
y it = a 1 + a 2 f it + a 3 g it + a 4 x it + a 5 l it + a 6 k it + e it
where the subscripts i and t are the respective country and time indexes; f and g are the measures of the syndrome-free regime and institutions/governance, respectively, l and k are the respective growth rates of labor and capital, and x is a vector of other control variables that might influence y; the respective coefficients of the above variables are to be estimated; and e is the error term, whose i.i.d.
properties are yet to be examined.
**** Table 3 about here****
Estimation and Results
Equation (5) XCONST, the degree of constraint on the executive, which is likely the most relevant institutions/governance variable in the present analysis, given that much of the evolution of the policy syndromes, as discussed above, revolves around the ability of the executive branch of government to make decisions very much at will, with little restraint. 18
Random-effects (RE) results are reported in 18 Also included is a measure of ethnic diversity which, a la Easterly and Levine (1997) , is hypothesized here to negatively affect SF, independently or interactively with XCONST.
As to be expected, the effect of capital formation, measured by the investment share of GDP, is strongly positive and significant in all equations. In contrast, the estimated impact of the labor variable, though positive, is generally insignificant. This is not surprising, since the coefficient equals (b-n), the difference between the coefficient of labor growth in the original production function, b, and the ratio of population growth to labor growth, n. This coefficient cannot be signed generally; it would be zero if population and labor grew at the same rate, and positive (negative) if labor growth was higher (lower) than population growth. (1997) This outcome suggests that the effects of these two variables on growth might be channeled, in large part, through SFREE. Moreover, the coefficient of SFREE is positive and highly significant, and its value of 2.2 is only slightly larger than that obtained in Fosu and O'Connell (2006) , despite the difference in models. 19 The SFREE effect, furthermore, appears invariant to the exclusion of l and k from the regression (compare for instance eqns. (3) and (4) Similarly, many of the policy syndromes could arguably be attributed to the unbridled powers of the executive in many African countries. Hence, improving governance by increasing XCONST, for instance, might be a way to limit the discretion of the executive for creating the policy syndromes, in the first place. 23 XCONST could, furthermore, serve as an effective policy instrument to limit the pernicious effect of ETHDIV. 24 21 Note that 'diversity' and 'division' are used interchangeably here, with both terms employed to indicate fractionalization as implied in Easterly and Levine (1997) . 22 For example, Alesina and Drazen (1991) presents a 'wars-of-attrition' political economy framework explaining why growth-enhancing stabilization is more likely to be delayed in a more ethnically heterogeneous society. Alternatively, one could envisage a situation of ethnically based 'it-is-our-turn' psychology. 23 For African countries the strong role of the executive appears to have largely contributed to the prevalence of the syndromes (see for instance Fosu, 2008a) . 24 Easterly (2001) and Collier (2000) , for example, argue that good institutions can resolve ethnic conflicts. Easterly, for instance, uses Knack and Keefer's (1995) comprehensive measure of institutional quality, which combines: (a) freedom from government repudiation of contracts, (b) freedom from expropriation, (c) rule of law, and (d) bureaucratic quality. XCONST is used in the present paper instead of these other variables in part because the other measures begin later in the 1970s or 1980s. Perhaps a more important rationale is also that XCONST is more of a policy instrument than these others; for example, how does one achieve the above comprehensive measure of institutional quality that contains all of these components? Furthermore, as apparent from the above discussion, many African government executives tended to appropriate to themselves strong powers, bereft of checks and balances, in order to be able to precipitate the policy syndromes that benefited their respective constituencies, at least in the short run (see . A way to curb this modus operandi would, therefore, entail appropriately increasing XCONST.
Consistent with findings by Easterly and Levine
Thus even though there appears to be no evidence for endogeneity in the above based on the probit. The IV also allows us to extend the analysis to 2004 by using the 27 Also estimated were models where investment was endogenously specified. The results are similar to the present ones, though the coefficient of INVEST tends to increase in size but decrease in statistical significance when INVEST is endogeneized. The robustness of SFREE, nonetheless, remains intact. 28 These results are similar to those obtained in Collier and O'Connell (2008, table 2.12) , despite the fact that slightly different instruments are employed here. That study, based on annual data, also uses, inter alia, PCWAR and the conjunction of ETHDIV and a self-constructed variable measuring 'rule by fear'. Employing a more apparent governance variable like XCONST here allows further exploration of the extent to which governance can realistically be used as a policy instrument to mitigate the pernicious effects of ethnic division, for instance. 29 Note that as in 2SLS, the GMM also employs the remaining variables in the regression as instruments for SFREE. estimated values of SFREE. Interestingly, these results are similar to those of the GMM in table 4. In particular, the coefficients of ETHDIV and XCONST are significantly negative and positive, respectively, while that of ETHXC is significantly positive.
Based on eqn. 2.1 of table 5, the completely diversity-neutralizing value of XCONST is estimated at 9.5, 30 which is, remarkably, statistically indistinguishable from the 9.8 estimated under the GMM. Similarly, this current estimate is also not feasible,
given the upper limit of 7.0 for XCONST. Nevertheless, at this upper limit, the estimated effect of ETHDIV is only -0.186, once again less than one-half of the implied value of -0.542 at the average minimum XCONST value attained in the 1980s.
Eqns. 1.2 and 2.2 of table 5 present the IV results from estimating the structural growth models. The current results are very similar to those of their GMM counterparts:
the estimated effects of INVEST and SFREE are positive and highly significant, while that of labor is insignificant. The SFREE coefficient, moreover, is larger and slightly more significant in the current specification than in the GMM. These outcomes are likely attributable to the application of more focused instruments than in the case of the GMM that entailed the use of INVEST and LABOR as additional (internal) instruments, thus resulting in more precise estimation of SFREE in the current case. 31 The estimated coefficient of SFREE from the IV of about 4.5 suggests that in the absence of policy syndromes, per capita growth in African economies could have averaged 4.5 percentage points higher, an amount that exceeds the growth deficits with all regions of the world. 32
Conclusion
The current paper has, first, presented strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the growth record of African economies over the last four decades or so can be attributed to TFP. The productivity explanation is not, however, limited to the dismal growth experienced generally by these economies in the 1980s and early 1990s as observed by 30 That is, 0.711/0.075 = 9.5. 31 Other possible explanations might include the slight extension of the sample size by the use of the IV to estimate missing SFREE values for the additional 2001-2004 sub-period. In addition, the probit is used in the first-stage of the IV estimation while the linear probability was applied in the GMM. Nonetheless, restricting the sample to 1960-2000 or using the linear probability at the first stage of the IV produced similar results as those reported herein. 32 The highest SSA per-capita growth deficit for 1960-2000 was with East Asia and Pacific and is estimated at about 3.4 percentage points (Ndulu and O'Connell, 2003) . previous studies. Conversely, the recent growth resurgence as of the mid-1990s could reasonably be attributed to major improvements in TFP.
Second, the paper has applied the 'policy-syndrome' taxonomy to explain the observed growth. Based on half-decadal 1960-2000 panel data for up to 38 African countries, it is estimated that being free of such syndromes could have added as much as 4.5 percentage points annually to growth. This estimate exceeds the growth deficit with any region of the world since 1960. Thus, achieving a syndrome-free (SF) environment should represent a major policy objective.
Third, the paper finds that ethnic division (fractionalization) reduces the probability of attaining SF, while governance/institutional quality, represented by the degree of constraint on the executive of government, XCONST, can enhance SF.
Furthermore, XCONST helps to mitigate the pernicious effect of ethnicity. Thus, holding the executive in greater check appears to be an important antidote to the policy syndrome woes of many African countries.
A crucial issue, then, is how to accentuate XCONST. Recent research suggests, for instance, that increasing electoral competitiveness can enhance growth in 'advancedlevel' democracies in Africa (Fosu, 2008b) . 33 If so, then future research should examine how this form of democracy, in particular, may be capable of accentuating XCONST. Notes: Computed from 47 African countries. All syndrome/syndrome-free classifications are defined in the text. The relative frequencies have been adjusted here to sum to 1.0 for each period, as multiple syndromes for a given country-year could occur. Source: Fosu (2011) [for source of the raw data see Ndulu et al, 2008a,b] 1960-2000 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-2000 1 9 6 0 -6 4 1 9 6 5 -6 9 1 9 7 0 -7 4 1 9 7 5 -7 9 1 9 8 0 -8 4 1 9 8 5 -8 9 1 9 9 0 -9 4 1 9 1 9 6 0 -6 4 1 9 6 5 -6 9 1 9 7 0 -7 4 1 9 7 5 -7 9 1 9 8 0 -8 4 1 9 8 5 -8 9 1 9 9 0 -9 4 1 9 9 5 -0 0 Source: Based on data from tables 1 and 2
